Radio, as part of modernization,
started a new type of entertainment promoting modern music, and western adaptations
of radio dramas (overall, a new popular culture). As Michael Robinson mentions,
this was often seen as vulgar or offensive to conservatory people because it
did not fit the traditional Korean culture. They thought this was actually a
degradation of their morals, and in order to avoid this, more scholarly programs
should be broadcasted. However, this was not entirely possible, especially
during the early period when there was only one radio station in Korea (mostly
dominated by programs in Japanese).
Another issue that appeared with
the introduction of radio in Korea, was the Japanese control for promoting Imperial
ideas. M. Robinson starts his article my mentioning that the “Japanese
officials recognized immediately the potential of broadcasting to further the
language goals of spreading Japanese-language use and Japanese culture values”.
However, I don’t completely agree with this. From the author’s description of
how the radio developed in Korea, we can see that all the Japanese officials
tried to do was to censor and control what was broadcasted to the Koreans. They
tried to take as much Korean content as possible and replace it with something
Japanese. In my opinion this rather shows that the Japanese noticed the
potential of the radio in spreading Korean culture (and probably nationalistic
ideas) so they tried to stop that by replacing a great deal of it with Japanese
shows. If the Japanese really wanted to spread Japanese culture they should
have tried to increase the number of Korean listeners and after that to make
Japanese values appealing to the Koreans. This could have been achieved in
various. For example the movie Radio Dayz shows one way: make a show which
Koreans would enjoy and introduce some subliminal messages (of course this didn’t
work out as planned in the movie, but in real life it could have been done).
Another point that makes me believe
that Robinson’s idea is not correct is the statistics he presents. The number
of Koreans that were initially listening to the radio was around 13%-15%, and
assuming that those numbers were taken at that time (to be accurate), than the
Japanese must have been aware of this as well. Moreover, if you want to send a
propaganda message you must make sure that the message reaches the target audience.
Therefore, since the Japanese officials were fine with the low number of Korean
listeners, I must only guess that their purpose was to deny to the Koreans the
possibility of using the radio to send nationalistic messages.
Moreover, if their true intention
was to send a propaganda message to the Koreans they should have made radio more
available (and affordable); maybe they could sponsor it and make sure that the
average Korean has access to it. Since they chose a noncommercial radio, and
since they didn’t try to help the station when it had financial problems I can
only assume that they were not aware of the potential power that radio can have
in spreading Japanese culture among the Koreans. The number of Korean listeners
started to increase only after they released a second station with more Korean
programs and this time not because the Japanese wanted more Korean listeners to
listen to their message, but because the first station needed more listeners in
order to avoid bankruptcy.
Overall, the author says that the Japanese used the radio well in manipulating the masses, but I think this is not true,
or at least not during the first or second decade of radio use.
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